"AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS:" ASSAD'S
This is a little out of date, coming before the recent rebel victories.
"These manpower limitations have led Assad to adopt a military strategy of an ‘army in all corners’ which involves the establishment and defense of remote regime outposts throughout Syria in order to pin the outer bounds of a contiguous post-war Syrian state. Assad likely hopes that this strategy will enable him to avoid decisive defeat while still outwardly claiming to control all of Syria, eventually translating into international political legitimacy."
And how his legitimacy has been prolonged by those like Patrick Cockburn, who claimed that he still has substantial report because he still held most of each of the provincial capitals. And this is why the idea that Assad could retreat to an Alawite sectarian state consisting of Damascus, what's left of Homs and Lattakia, are a fantasy, once the opposition can present itself as an alternative national leadership, they will get the recognition and the weaponry to finish off Assad in short order.
"These manpower limitations have led Assad to adopt a military strategy of an ‘army in all corners’ which involves the establishment and defense of remote regime outposts throughout Syria in order to pin the outer bounds of a contiguous post-war Syrian state. Assad likely hopes that this strategy will enable him to avoid decisive defeat while still outwardly claiming to control all of Syria, eventually translating into international political legitimacy."
And how his legitimacy has been prolonged by those like Patrick Cockburn, who claimed that he still has substantial report because he still held most of each of the provincial capitals. And this is why the idea that Assad could retreat to an Alawite sectarian state consisting of Damascus, what's left of Homs and Lattakia, are a fantasy, once the opposition can present itself as an alternative national leadership, they will get the recognition and the weaponry to finish off Assad in short order.
"Bashar al-Assad is neither a viable partner against the Islamic State (ISIS) nor the “least worst option” for U.S. national interests in Syria for three reasons. First, the Assad regime cannot control the territory that was Syria or win the Syrian war decisively. Second, the Assad regime is Iran’s strategic asset in Syria and Assad is beholden to Iran for keeping his military viable. Third, Assad’s brutal tactics and humanitarian abuses have accelerated the growth of jihadist groups regionally and globally."
That's true.
That's true.
"Allowing the Syrian regime to conduct its military campaign with impunity sows the seeds for generations of regional disorder to come and empowers the expansionist designs of the Iranian regime. The U.S. does possess additional cards that it could place on the table for resolving the Syrian conflict, including the imposition of a No Fly Zone over opposition-held areas or an expedited effort to train-and-equip Syrian opposition fighters alongside regional allies. If U.S. policymakers do not adopt a more forceful and focused approach to Syria, the only foreseeable outcome is a fragmented and failed Syrian state which menaces its neighbors and brutalizes its people."
Or that the Syrians might win their freedom without outside help, which is another reason for the US to change course, so they aren't as despised in post-war Syria as the Iranians and Russians will be.
Or that the Syrians might win their freedom without outside help, which is another reason for the US to change course, so they aren't as despised in post-war Syria as the Iranians and Russians will be.
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